PSC REF#:229719

Public Service Commission of Wisconsin RECEIVED: 01/14/15, 11:49:51 AM

BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF WISCONSIN

Application of Wisconsin Energy Corporation)	
For Approval of a Transaction by which)	
Wisconsin Energy Corporation Would Acquire)	Docket No. 9400-YO-100
All of the Outstanding Common Stock of)	
Integrys Energy Group, Inc.)	

DIRECT TESTIMONY OF RICHARD S. HAHN ON BEHALF OF THE CITIZENS UTILITY BOARD OF WISCONSIN January 14, 2015

1 I. Introduction

2	Q.	What is your name and business address?
3	A.	My name is Richard S. Hahn. I am employed by La Capra Associates, Inc. ("La Capra")
4		as a Principal Consultant. My business address is One Washington Mall, Boston, MA
5		02108.
6		
7	Q.	On whose behalf are you testifying in this proceeding?
8	А.	I am testifying on behalf of the Citizens Utility Board of Wisconsin ("CUB").
9		
10	Q.	Please describe your education and employment background.
11	A.	I received my Bachelor's in Science, Electrical Engineering, in 1973, and my Master's in
12		Science, Electrical Engineering, in 1974, both from Northeastern University. I received
13		my Master's in Business Administration from Boston College in 1982. Since joining La
14		Capra, I have worked on many projects related to mergers and acquisitions, investments
15		in energy infrastructure, energy markets, forecasts of wholesale market prices, utility
16		resource planning projects, electric transmission projects, and asset valuations. Prior to
17		joining La Capra, I worked at NSTAR Electric & Gas (formerly Boston Edison
18		Company) from 1973 to 2003. Throughout my career, I have gained and demonstrated

2 3 considerable experience and expertise in many utility-related matters. I am a registered professional electrical engineer in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

4 Q. Please summarize La Capra and its business.

5 A. La Capra provides consulting services in energy planning, market analysis, and 6 regulatory policy in the electricity and natural gas industries. We serve a national and 7 international clientele from our offices in Boston, Massachusetts, Portland, Maine, and 8 Essex Junction, Vermont providing consulting services to a broad range of organizations 9 involved with energy markets, including renewable energy producers, private and public 10 utilities, transmission owners, energy producers and traders, energy consumers and 11 consumer advocates, regulatory agencies, and public policy and energy research 12 organizations. Our technical skills include power market forecasting models and 13 methods, economics, management, planning, rates and pricing, energy procurement and contracting, and reliability assessments. Our experience includes detailed analyses of 14 15 energy and environmental performance of the electric systems, economic planning for 16 transmission and distribution, and market analytics. As shown in detail on my resume 17 attached hereto as Ex.-CUB-Hahn-1, I have testified as a witness in several public utility 18 merger or acquisition cases.

19

20 Q. Have you previously testified before the Public Service Commission of Wisconsin 21 ("PSC" or "the Commission")?

22 A. I have testified in several proceedings before this Commission. My testimonies have 23 covered the reasonableness of projected fuel costs for Wisconsin Electric Power 24 Company ("WEPCO"), Wisconsin Public Service Corporation ("WPSC"), Northern States Power – Wisconsin ("NSPW"), and Madison Gas and Electric Company ("MGE"). 25 26 I also testified regarding the appropriateness of environmental upgrades to Wisconsin 27 power plants at the Edgewater, Columbia, and Oak Creek stations. I testified in the 28 proceeding to review the proposed biomass-fired cogeneration plant in Rothschild, 29 Wisconsin and in the proceeding to review the proposed 345 KV transmission line from 30 Minnesota to La Crosse. I also filed testimony on behalf of CUB in Docket No. 6690-31 CE-198 which reviewed WPSC's application for approval of its System Modernization

1		and Reliability Project and in the proceeding where WEPCO applied for authority to
2		convert the Valley Power Plant from coal to natural gas. On December 10, 2014, my
3		direct testimony was filed in Docket No. 137-CE-166 regarding the Application of
4		American Transmission Company, LLC ("ATC") seeking authority to construct the
5		North Appleton to Morgan transmission upgrade.
6		
7	Q.	What is the purpose of your testimony in this proceeding?
8	А.	The purpose of my testimony is to address the following issues:
9		• Whether the acquisition is required to achieve the stated objectives.
10		• The appropriateness of ring-fencing provisions.
11		• The level of potential synergies if the acquisition is approved.
12		• Whether the acquisition complies with the Wisconsin standard for holding company
13		acquisitions.
14		• The status of proceedings in Illinois and Michigan that are analyzing the proposed
15		acquisition.
16		• If the acquisition is to be approved, identifying conditions to approval that should be
17		established to protect customers of both WEPCO and WPSC.
18		
19	Q.	What exhibits are you sponsoring?
20	A.	In addition to this direct testimony, I am sponsoring seven exhibits:
21		• <u>ExCUB-Hahn-1</u> , - Resume of Richard S. Hahn.
22		• <u>ExCUB-Hahn-2</u> , - Excerpts from 2013 Form 10K Report for Integrys Energy
23		Group, Inc. ("Integrys" or "TEG").
24		• <u>ExCUB-Hahn-3</u> , - Moody's Report 2002 for NiSource.
25		• <u>ExCUB-Hahn-4</u> , - Moody's Report 2008 for NiSource.
26		• <u>ExCUB-Hahn-5</u> , - List of Transaction Conditions Proposed in Illinois.
27		• <u>ExCUB-Hahn-6</u> , - Wisconsin Energy Corporation ("WEC") Form 8k Report,
28		November 12, 2014.
29		• <u>ExCUB-Hahn-7</u> , - Michigan Governor Press Release, January 13, 2015.
30		
31	Q.	Does your testimony contain information claimed to be confidential?

1	A.	Yes. My testimony contains information claimed to be confidential by WEC and
2		Integrys. Information that is claimed by WEC to be WEC Confidential –
3		Attorney/Reviewer Eyes Only is shaded in blue and information that is claimed by
4		Integrys to be Integrys Confidential – Attorney/Reviewer Eyes Only is shaded in green.
5		
6		
7	II.	Summary of Conclusions
8	Q.	Please summarize your conclusions and recommendations regarding the issues
9		addressed in your testimony.
10	A.	Based upon my review, I offer the following conclusions:
11		• No quantifiable benefits to Wisconsin ratepayers have been identified to occur as
12		a result of this acquisition.
13		• The primary objective of the acquisition is to create a larger company with
14		improved access to capital markets. However, no evidence has been provided by
15		WEC or Integrys to show that a larger company will actually have such improved
16		access. To the contrary, I have performed an independent assessment which
17		shows that larger companies do not necessarily result in improved access to
18		capital markets.
19		• The acquisition is not required to achieve the other stated objectives of the
20		proposed transaction.
21		• There is a potential for the acquisition to cause harm to Wisconsin ratepayers.
22		• The conditions identified in WEC's application in this proceeding ("the
23		Application") are inadequate to protect Wisconsin ratepayers from potential harm.
24		Based upon these conclusions, I find that because there are no identified benefits that will
25		accrue to Wisconsin ratepayers, the proposed transaction is not in the public interest and
26		does not meet the standard for approving WEC's proposed acquisition of Integrys.
27		Therefore, the transaction as proposed should not be approved. However, if the
28		Commission should approve the proposed transaction, it should impose additional
29		conditions - as described in detail in this testimony – in order to adequately protect
30		Wisconsin ratepayers.

1 III. Overview of the Proposed Transaction

2 **Q.** Please briefly describe the proposed transaction.

- A. WEC proposes to acquire all of the outstanding common stock of TEG. Each existing
 share of TEG stock will be exchanged for 1.128 shares of WEC common stock plus
 \$18.58 in cash. The transaction was announced on June 23, 2014. The post-acquisition
 holding company would be called Wisconsin Energy Group, Inc. ("WEG").
- 7

8

Q. What is the approximate value of this transaction?

9 A. According to TEG's 2013 SEC Form 10K report, TEG had about 79.5 million shares of 10 common stock outstanding. The closing stock prices for WEC and TEG just prior to the 11 proposed transaction announcement were \$46.47 and \$60.33 per share respectively. The total value of cash consideration to be paid by WEC for each TEG share is about \$1.48 12 billion.¹ The value of 1.128 WEC shares exchanged for each TEG share is about \$4.17 13 billion,² bringing the total consideration received by TEG shareholders to \$5.64 billion, 14 15 or \$71.00 per share. The value of the TEG shares being surrendered is about \$4.80 16 billion, or \$60.33 per share. Thus, WEC is paying about \$840 million or a 17% abovemarket premium to acquire TEG. WEC will also assume TEG's existing debt of about 17 \$3.38 billion,³ bringing the approximate total value of the transaction to more than \$9 18 19 billion, excluding any transaction fees. Any transaction fees paid by WEC to 20 consummate the proposed acquisition will increase this figure. Excerpts from the 2013 21 Form 10K report for TEG are provided as Ex.-CUB-Hahn-2.

22

23 Q. What is the stated purpose of the proposed transaction?

- A. According to the Application, the transaction is in the best interests of utility consumers,
 investors, and the public because it will:⁴
- create a larger and financially stronger Midwestern utility company with greater
 liquidity and improved access to capital markets;

¹ 79.5 million TEG shares multiplied by \$18.58 per share.

² 79.5 million TEG shares multiplied by 1.128 multiplied by \$46.47 per share.

³ See Ex.-CUB-Hahn-2, TEG's 2013 SEC Form 10K report. *See also* Direct-WEC-Lauber-4 stating \$3.3 billion of transaction value is for assumed Integrys debt.

⁴ See Ex.-WEC-Lauber-1, pp. 1-2.

1		• strengthen each of the WEC Energy Group operating companies including its
2		Wisconsin electric and gas utilities, by integrating best practices in areas such as
3		distribution operations, large capital project management, gas supply, system
4		reliability and customer service;
5		• maintain WEC's and Integrys' long tradition of making significant contributions
6		to regional economic development and generous support of educational, cultural,
7		and charitable activities in the communities they serve;
8		• create a more diversified generation portfolio with a larger geographic footprint;
9		• facilitate continued prudent investment in needed utility infrastructure, including
10		the ability to use the strong cash flow of the combined companies to fund future
11		investments without issuing new equity; and
12		• position the combined entity for continued growth.
13		
14		Also according to the Application, the Transaction will benefit the customers of WEPCO,
15		Wisconsin Gas LLC ("WG") and WPSC over time by creating opportunities to achieve
16		savings through:
17		enhanced purchasing power;
18		• economies of scale;
19		• joint resource planning over a larger and more diverse system;
20		• the adoption and implementation of best practices;
21		• other efficiencies in operations and maintenance and project management; and
22		• sharing administrative and other service costs over a larger organization.
23		
24	Q.	Has the Applicant quantified any of these claimed benefits?
25	A.	No. The testimony of Mr. Reed on behalf of the Applicant states that typical
26		merger/acquisition savings can range from 3% to 5% of non-fuel O&M. However, WEC
27		states that synergies have not been quantified, nor have such potential savings been
28		considered in assessing the impact of WEC's proposed acquisition of TEG. Thus, the
29		primary justification for the acquisition appears to be the creation of a bigger company
30		that WEC believes will have better access to capital markets. No quantifiable benefits to

1		Wisconsin ratepayers have been estimated, projected, or considered when assessing the
2		impact of this proposed transaction.
3		
4		
5 6 7	IV.	The Wisconsin Standard for Acquisition of Public Utility Holding Companies
8	Q.	What is the standard of approval for the Application?
9	A.	According to the Application, the transaction requires the Commission's approval under
10		§ 196.795(3), Wis. Stat., ("Section 3") which requires that the acquisition of a Wisconsin
11		holding company (in this case, Integrys) be "in the best interests of utility consumers,
12		investors and the public." ⁵
13		
14	Q.	How do you interpret this standard?
15	A.	Given the requirement that the acquisition must be in the "best interests" of customers, I
16		interpret this standard to mean that the acquisition should provide benefits to Wisconsin
17		ratepayers.
18		
19		
20	V.	Company Size vs. Access to Capital Markets
21	Q.	Has WEC provided any analysis that shows that a larger company has better access
22		to capital markets?
23	A.	No, WEC has not provided any such analysis.
24		
25	Q.	Were you able to assess whether larger companies have greater access to capital
26		markets?
27	A.	Yes. The key determinant of a company's ability to access capital markets is that
28		company's credit rating. The better a credit rating, the easier and less expensive it is to
29		borrow money. I compared the credit rating of electric and natural gas companies versus
30		size. The credit rating I used was the Standard & Poor's ("S&P") Long Term Credit

⁵ Ex.-WEC-Laubuer-1, p. 10.

Rating, and company size was measured by net property, plant, and equipment ("PP&E"). The companies chosen in this comparison are all regulated electric and gas companies listed in the SNL database. Figure 1 below provides a scatter diagram of credit rating versus size for companies with regulated electric generation. There is no indication in this data that larger companies have higher credit ratings than smaller companies. In fact, the company with the highest credit rating is Madison Gas & Electric ("MGE"), a company that is much smaller than either WEPCO or WPSC.

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
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
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




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


A. I performed two other comparisons of credit rating versus size; one for companies with
 natural gas distribution and another for parent companies with regulated subsidiaries.
 Figures 2 and 3 below provide these comparisons. These additional comparisons confirm



the observation that there is no indication that larger companies have higher credit ratings than smaller companies.

Figure 3



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6

Q. Have either WEC or TEG asserted that they cannot access capital markets unless the transaction is approved?

A. No. According to the response to 2-CUB/Inter-6, neither "WEC nor Integrys contends
that if the transaction is not approved, it would be unable to invest prudently in needed
infrastructure."

10

11 Q. What do you conclude from this analysis?

A. The Applicant has provided no quantifiable analysis to support the contention that larger
 companies have improved access to capital markets. Comparative data on credit ratings
 versus size suggests that bigger companies do not have higher credit ratings. I conclude
 that being a bigger company does not necessarily result in improved access to capital

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5 VI. Assessment of Other Reasons for the Proposed Transaction

and should not be relied upon to justify the proposed transaction.

Q. Given that creating a larger company will not necessarily result in a financially stronger entity and that no quantifiable benefits to ratepayers have been identified, is the acquisition needed to achieve the other stated goals that the Applicant offers for the proposed transaction?

markets, so this asserted benefit from the proposed transaction has not been demonstrated

- 10 The proposed transaction does not appear to be needed to achieve the stated goals other A. 11 than to create a larger company. For example, the acquisition is not required to "maintain 12 WEC's and Integrys' long tradition of making significant contributions to regional 13 economic development and generous support of educational, cultural, and charitable activities in the communities they serve." Without the acquisition, each company would 14 15 be able to continue to make such contributions. The acquisition is not required to "create 16 a more diversified generation portfolio with a larger geographic footprint," as WEPCO 17 and WPSC will remain separate operating companies and each will utilize its existing 18 portfolio of resources to serve its customer base. The acquisition is not needed to 19 "facilitate continued prudent investment in needed utility infrastructure." As noted in 20 their response to 2-CUB/Inter-6, both WEC and TEG haves stated that they would be 21 able to invest in needed infrastructure if the transaction is not approved.
- 22 23

26

VII. What Concerns Should the Wisconsin Commission Have Regarding the Proposed Transaction?

- Q. The proposed transaction is an acquisition by a parent utility holding company of
 another parent utility holding company. How will this transaction affect companies
 regulated by the Commission?
- A. The Applicant has stated that it will not combine any of the companies regulated by the
 Commission without Commission approval. The Applicant has also stated that it has not

1

3

4 Q. If the companies regulated by the Commission may not be immediately affected by 5 the transaction, why should the Commission be concerned about the proposed 6 transaction?

estimated any savings or synergies due to the proposed transaction. Thus, the companies

regulated by the Commission may not be immediately affected by the transaction.

7 A. The Wisconsin utility holding company acquisition standard requires that the transaction 8 be "in the best interests of utility consumers, investors and the public." Without any 9 identified savings to ratepayers of WEPCO, WPSC, or WG, it is difficult to see how this 10 acquisition could benefit ratepayers and be in the public interest. Moreover, WEC is 11 paying an above-market premium to acquire TEG. Investors providing funds to WEC to 12 pay this above-market premium are expecting an adequate return. Post-transaction, the 13 proposed post-acquisition holding company, WEG, will generate most of its earnings and profits from its regulated subsidiaries, the largest of which are companies regulated by 14 15 the Commission, especially since TEG has already sold Integrys Energy Services, an unregulated subsidiary.⁶ If the acquisition is approved, WEG will need to generate 16 17 increased earnings, profits, and cash at the parent company level to fund the above-18 market premium. To do this, WEG would likely need to extract higher earnings, profits, 19 and cash flow from its regulated subsidiaries, including WEPCO, WG, WPSC, and ATC. 20 Without sufficient synergies or savings that can be shared equitably between shareholders 21 and ratepayers, these higher earnings and profits will need to come from higher rates at 22 regulated subsidiaries. Thus, it is possible that ratepayers could be harmed by the 23 proposed transaction if it is approved as proposed. The Commission should be very 24 concerned about this possibility, especially given the lack of synergies identified by the 25 Applicant.

- 26
- 27

Q. Can you illustrate this concern in more detail?

A. Prior to the acquisition (assuming for purposes of this illustration that the acquisition is
 approved) the revenues, net income, and cash flow of WEC and TEG supported their
 respective stock prices. After the acquisition but without any synergies, the post-

⁶ Constellation completed its acquisition of IES on November 3, 2014.

1 acquisition revenues, net income, and cash flow of WEC and TEG will be the sum of the 2 separate pre-acquisition values, but the post-acquisition entity will have more debt and 3 more shares of stock to support financially. For example, the new debt issued to fund a portion of the acquisition price is \$ ⁷ Assuming an interest rate for new debt of 4 5 5%, the interest on this incremental debt will be about \$ annually. All else being equal, pre-tax expenses will increase by \$, resulting in lower net income 6 7 and lower cash flow from operations. Thus, the post-acquisition company could be 8 financially weaker than the separate companies pre-acquisition.

9

10

Has the credit rating of the Applicant been affected by the acquisition **Q**. 11 announcement?

On June 23, 2014, Moody's downgraded WEC's ratings outlook to negative from stable 12 A. 13 after the announcement that WEC would acquire TEG. Moody's expectation is that the transaction will be detrimental to WEC's credit rating because it is acquiring "a company 14 with a weaker credit rating in a leveraged transaction."⁸ S&P downgraded outlooks for 15 16 WEC, TEG and subsidiary companies North Shore Gas and Peoples Gas from stable to 17 negative following the announcement of WEC's acquisition of TEG. S&P expects "that the incremental debt associated with this transaction will weaken WEC's financial 18 measures. Therefore, we believe that the company's consolidated financial risk profile 19 20 could fall toward the lower end of our 'significant' financial risk profile category, leaving little room for underperformance relative to our forecast."⁹ Fitch had a similar response 21 22 to the announcement placing WEC's rating on Rating Watch Negative on June 24, 2014. According to Fitch, "The proposed acquisition results in a meaningful increase in 23 24 consolidated leverage compared to WEC's current and projected pre-acquisition financial position." Further, the agency said it is concerned about "the aggressive dividend policy 25 26 adopted by management," adding that it "expects leverage metrics of the combined 27 entities to be weak for the current rating category and significantly weaker than WEC's

⁷ See the document entitled " ", p. 2 "S&U" that WEC produced in discovery in this docket. WEC deems this document highly confidential and filed it via ERF as "IL WEC City 6.01 Attach 01 CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY."

with its public response to Data Request No. PSCW-01.26. ⁹ *Id*. ⁸ Applicant filed the ratings reports from Moody's (June 23, 2014), S&P (June 23, 2014), and Fitch (June 24, 2014)

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Q. In the above example, why did you assume a 5% interest rate for new debt?

weaker than the individual pre-acquisition companies.

stand-alone credit profile."¹⁰ Thus, the ratings agencies appear to support my

observation that absent any synergies, the post-acquisition entity could be financially

A. In May 2014, WEPCO issued \$250 million in new 30-year debt at a rate of 4.25% and in
November 2013, WPSC issued \$450 million in new 30-year debt at an interest rate of
4.75%.¹¹ In 2015, the assumed year of issuing new acquisition debt, it is expected that
interest rates will be higher. Since the announcement, WEC's outlook has been
downgraded, which could result in higher borrowing rates. Under these circumstances,
the 5% interest rate for new acquisition debt used in my illustrative example above is a
reasonable assumption.

13

14 Q. Could synergies offset these higher costs of supporting the acquisition premium?

15 A. In theory, a transaction could yield enough synergies to offset or exceed the higher 16 acquisition costs and still provide benefits to both shareholders and ratepayers. However, 17 in this case, that may be difficult. The high end of Mr. Reed's savings estimate is 5% of 18 non-fuel O&M costs. Not all O&M costs are avoidable. In addition to fuel expenses, 19 purchased power and transmission of electricity by others are costs that are generally not 20 controllable or avoidable due to an acquisition or merger transaction. These costs will 21 still be incurred after the proposed transaction. The remaining O&M costs are candidates 22 for synergies. I would expect that most of the savings would come from WEPCO and 23 WPSC, as these are the largest regulated subsidiaries and their respective service 24 territories are intermingled, which affords the greatest opportunity for savings. Figure 4 25 below provides a summary of controllable O&M costs for WEPCO and WPSC of almost 26 \$1.5 billion. Five percent of this amount is approximately \$73.6 million. So, even if all 27 of these savings went to shareholders and none to ratepayers, these savings would not 28 offset the higher annual debt costs identified above.

 $^{^{10}}$ See Id.

¹¹ See WEC's Response to Data Request 2-CUB/RFP-13, p. 2 (PSC REF#: 225013) for WEPCO, and Ex.-CUB-Hahn-2, p. 77 for WPSC.

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	(\$millions)	
Item	WEPCO	WPS	Sum
Total O&M Expense	\$2,449.3	\$935.4	\$3,384.7
less: Fuel	\$502.2	\$235.5	\$737.7
ess: Purchased Power	\$545.3	\$253.3	\$798.7
ess: Transmission of Electricity by Others	\$259.1	\$118.4	\$377.5
Controllable O&M	\$1,142.6	\$328.2	\$1,470.9
Source: 2013 FERC Form 1 Reports			
is important to note that the above example	e does not rep	resent a com	plete anal

Figure 4

Lastly, I note that the combined 2013 revenues of WEPCO and WPSC are about \$5.42 8 billion.¹² If all of the \$73.6 million in synergies went to ratepayers, it would represent 9 less than a 1.4% rate reduction. 10




13	A.	Yes.
14		
15		13
16		
17		proposed transaction.
18		
19	Q.	If the acquisition were to be approved as proposed, how could post-acquisition
20		WEC extract higher earnings, net income, and cash flow from the regulated
21		operating subsidiary level to the parent company level?


 ¹² See the 2013 FERC Form 1 Reports for WEC and TEG.
 ¹³ See TEG's Response to Data Request No. PSCW-13.12 (PSC REF#: 224863) which directs to TEG's response to Data Request No. PSCW-10.02 (PSC REF#: 223823). The data responsive to PSCW-10.02 is considered "Highly Confidential" by TEG and TEG saved to an e-room. This confidential portion of testimony is based on documents TEG saved to the e-room.

1	A.	One way to achieve this outcome would be to increase dividend payments to the parent.
2		This means the regulated subsidiaries would retain less cash than would be otherwise
3		used to invest in utility infrastructure. Another possible mechanism would be to hold
4		regulated rates at current levels and reduce costs. This will result in higher net income
5		and facilitate higher cash dividends to the parent. Another mechanism would be to
6		increase the expansion of the ATC system. Transmission companies such as ATC are
7		regulated by FERC, and often achieve higher returns on equity ("ROEs") than do
8		companies with generating and distribution assets whose rates are regulated at the state
9		level. Post-acquisition, ATC's transmission investments could be increased above the
10		levels that were expected or planned prior to the acquisition, generating higher earnings,
11		net income and cash flow to the parent company. The acquisition will facilitate this
12		outcome because WEC will own a controlling interest in ATC,
13		¹⁴ These are just a few
14		examples, and there are undoubtedly other means that the applicant could use to achieve
15		this outcome. Any of these mechanisms for extracting higher earnings, net income, and
16		cash flow from the regulated subsidiaries could adversely affect Wisconsin ratepayers.
17		
18	Q.	Has the Applicant provided an assessment of the financial impact of the proposed
19		transaction?
20	A.	
21		
22		15
23		
24		
25		
26		
27		

 ¹⁴ See
 Attorney/Reviewer Eyes only document saved to the Integrys e-room in response to Data Request No. PSCW 10.06 and titled
 ¹⁵ See the document entitled " " that WEC

produced in discovery in this docket. WEC deems this document highly confidential and filed it via ERF as "IL WEC City 6.01 Attach 01 CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY."





¹⁶ See WEC's response to Data Request No. PSCW-01.13, the public version of which is PSC REF#: 219081.

much higher than WEC's, the averaging of the earnings per share figure will result in
 WEC having a higher post-acquisition earnings per share figure, even with a higher
 number of shares issued and some loss of net income due to recovery of acquisition costs.
 Figure 6 below illustrates this point. Being accretive does not necessarily mean a
 financially stronger entity.

Figure 6 Post-acquisition Accretion Example

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	Pre-acquisition		Post-acquisition		
	WEC	TEG	WEC adj	TEC adj	WEC post- acquisition
Net income	\$577.4	\$350.0	(\$53.5)		\$873.9
# of shares	227.6	79.5	89.7	(79.5)	317.3
EPS	\$2.54	\$4.40			\$2.75

9 10

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Q. If the proposed transaction is to be approved, how can the Commission protect ratepayers from adverse outcomes?

14 It is probably not feasible to completely protect against 100% of potential adverse A. 15 outcomes. One way to mitigate the impact of potential adverse outcomes to ratepayers is 16 to establish ring-fencing provisions that become binding conditions of any approved 17 acquisition. A ring-fencing provision is a condition that creates a ring or a fence around 18 regulated subsidiaries that protects that entity from the activities and actions of its parent 19 company and other affiliates. For example, as a condition of approving the proposed 20 transaction, the Commission could prohibit a regulated subsidiary from loaning money to 21 or borrowing from its parent. Ring-fencing provisions are discussed more fully in a later

1		section of this testimony. Ring-fencing provisions are very common in mergers and
2		acquisitions that involve regulated subsidiaries and affiliates.
3		
4	Q.	Are you aware of any other acquisitions and/or mergers where the lack of ring-
5		fencing provisions became an issue for a regulated subsidiary?
6	A.	Yes.
7		
8	Q.	Please describe an example.
9	A.	NiSource Inc. ("NiSource") experienced two major mergers in the late 1990s to early
10		2000s. First, Bay State Gas Company ("Bay State"), a Massachusetts gas distribution
11		company, became an affiliate of NIPSCO in 1998 following a merger with Northern
12		Indiana Public Service Company and NIPSCO Acquisition Company. NIPSCO
13		subsequently changed its name to NiSource.
14		
15		Two years later, NiSource agreed to merge with another holding company, Columbia
16		Energy Group ("Columbia"). To finance the merger with Columbia, NiSource intended
17		to sell \$1 billion in assets and assume up to \$6 billion in debt. Cash payments to
18		Columbia shareholders were estimated to be between \$3.9 billion, assuming a 30%
19		exchange of stock, and \$5 billion, assuming no exchange for NiSource stock. NiSource
20		would also assume \$2.4 billion of Columbia's outstanding debt after the merger.
21		
22	Q.	What was the impact of the Columbia/NiSource merger on the credit ratings of
23		NiSource and its subsidiaries?
24	A.	ExCUB-Hahn-3 and ExCUB-Hahn-4 include two Moody's credit reports relevant to
25		this issue. ExCUB-Hahn-3 is a Moody's report from February 2002, two years after the
26		completion of the merger. At that time, Moody's downgraded the debt ratings of
27		NiSource and its subsidiaries, "all with negative outlooks." NiSource senior secured debt
28		and premium income equity securities ratings were downgraded to Baa3 and NiSource
29		subsidiaries' senior unsecured debt (Bay State, Columbia, Indianapolis Water Company,
30		NIPSCO) were downgraded to Baa2.
31		

1	Q.	Why were they downgraded?
2	A.	Moody's explained the downgrades:
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11		The downgrades reflect higher-than-expected debt levels and weaker-than- expected cash flow from [NiSource's] subsidiaries With market capital of roughly \$4 billion, it will be a challenge to issue enough equity to offset over \$8 billion of debt on its balance sheetThe two-notch downgrades for Columbia and NIPSO and the three-notch downgrades for Bay State and Indianapolis Water Company align the ratings of the subsidiaries and bring them closer to the parent. The change in notching reflects the subsidiaries' financial and operational integration with the parent and lack of regulatory ring-fencing.
11		The report attributed the worsening credit ratings of the subsidiaries to the lack of ring-
13		fencing provisions that allowed NiSource to require increased dividend payments from its
13		affiliates.
15		
16	Q.	Did NiSource and its subsidiaries continue to receive weak credit ratings from lack
17		of regulatory ring-fencing provisions?
18	A.	Yes. ExCUB-Hahn-4 provides a Moody's report from October 2008, six years after the
19		first report. The second report stated that NiSource subsidiaries would receive higher
20		ratings as standalone "if it were not for the substantial parent obligations they help to
21		support." The report explicitly stated that the lack of ring-fencing provisions failed to
22		insulate the subsidiaries from their parent debt. The lack of ring-fencing provisions was
23		still an issue eight years after NiSource assumed the enormous debt from the Columbia
24		merger.
25		
26 27 28 29		Their ratings are notched closely to the parent's debt Baa3 rating because of the centralized cash management and little ring-fencing restriction against the parent upstreaming cash and potentially putting more debt at the subsidiaries. ¹⁷
30		It is important to note that I do not state that such adverse outcomes will occur with the
31		proposed transaction. I cite this example to show what <u>might</u> happen and illustrate why
32		the Commission needs to establish adequate ring-fencing provisions if the proposed
33		transaction is to be approved.

¹⁷ Ex.-CUB-Hahn-4, p. 9.

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2	VIII.	Review of the Proposed Transaction in Illin	ois
3	Q.	Has an application relating to the proposed transa	ction been filed with the Illinois
4		Commerce Commission ("ICC")?	
5	A.	Yes. WEC, TEG, Peoples Energy LLC., the Peoples O	Gas Light and Coke Company
6		("Peoples Gas"), North Shore Gas Company ("North	Shore"), ATC Management Inc.,
7		and American Transmission Company, LLC filed a jo	int application and testimony on
8		August 6, 2014 in Docket Number 14-0496.	
9			
10	Q.	What is the status of Illinois Docket Number 14-04	96?
11	A.	On January 2, 2015, the People of the State of Illinois	by the Illinois Attorney General
12		and the City of Chicago filed a motion to extend the s	chedule in the case. On January 8,
13		2015, the Administrative Law Judge issued a Notice of	of Continuance of Hearing and
14		scheduled a status hearing for January 20, 2015. Staff	and Intervenor Direct testimony
15		and applicant Rebuttal testimony have been filed.	
16			
17	Q.	What's the upcoming schedule for Illinois Docket 1	Number 14-0496?
18	A.	Before the motion to extend the schedule was filed, th	e schedule was:
19		Staff and Intervenor Rebuttal Testimony	January 15, 2015
20		Applicant Surrebuttal Testimony	January 29, 2015
21		Pretrial Motions	February 11, 2015
22		Evidentiary Hearings	February 18-20, 2015
23		Briefs	March 18, 2015
24		Reply Briefs	April 3, 2015
25		Draft Orders/Statements of Positions	April 8, 2015
26		Deadline for Commission Action	July 6, 2015
27			
28	Q.	Who are the intervenors in ICC Docket Number 14	4-0496?
29	A.	Retail Energy Supply Association ("RESA"), the Illin	ois Attorney General on behalf of
30		the People of the State of Illinois, ICC Staff, the City	of Chicago, Utility Workers of
31		America Local 18007 and the Illinois Citizens Utility	Board have all filed testimony.

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Q. Did the intervenors suggest any conditions for approval of the joint application?

A. Yes. A full list of conditions unedited from their original versions is provided in Ex.-CUB-Hahn-5. I developed this list from testimony filed in Illinois and have summarized below a few conditions that were either proposed by more than one intervenor or could be relevant to the Wisconsin proceeding. The following are examples of issues raised by the intervenors.

7 8

9 Christopher Wheat for the Illinois Citizens Utility Board and City of Chicago, David 10 Effron for the Illinois Attorney General's Office, and Eric Lounsberry from ICC Staff all 11 raise concerns about the Joint Applicants' commitment to keep 1,952 full time employees 12 in Illinois for two years after the closing of the proposed transaction. The Illinois 13 intervenors note that these numbers are short 5-7% of the forecasted levels of 14 employment in the ongoing rate cases of the Peoples Gas and North Shore gas companies 15 (collectively, "Gas Companies"), Docket Nos. 14-0224/0225. Therefore, either the Gas 16 Companies are seeking to recover salaries for staffing levels that they do not expect to 17 meet or they intend to reduce staffing levels thereby putting safe and reliable service at 18 risk. These intervenors reached similar conclusions with respect to FTE levels after the 19 proposed transaction, and have testified that the Joint Applicants must address and update the appropriate levels of FTE as condition of acquisition approval.¹⁸ 20

21

22 Illinois intervenors have also been concerned with the completion of Peoples Gas' 23 Accelerated Main Replacement Program ("AMRP"). William Cheaks Junior and Michael 24 Gorman for the Illinois Citizens Utility Board and the City of Chicago, Sebastian 25 Coppola for the Illinois Attorney General, and Eric Lounsberry from ICC Staff all discuss 26 Peoples Gas' inadequate execution and commitment to the AMRP. They suggest 27 additional measures for oversight over the program and note WEC's lack of a thorough due diligence review of the AMRP, which could impose risk given continual escalation in

- 28
- 29 construction costs and delays. Furthermore, Michael Gorman states that for approval of

¹⁸ ICC City/CUB Exhibit 1.0, Direct Testimony of Christopher Wheat, ICC AG Exhibit 1.0, Direct Testimony of David Effron, and ICC Staff Exhibit 2.0, Direct Testimony of Eric Lounsberry, available on the ICC website.

1		the transaction, the joint applicants should accept	ring-fencing provisions in order to
2		ensure that Peoples Gas funds the AMRP in a tim	ely manner and is not impacted by
3		holding company debt following the acquisition. ¹	9
4			
5		Lastly, I highlight the testimony of ICC Staff with	ness Michael McNally. Mr. McNally
6		suggests five conditions that could be described a	s ring-fencing provisions. These
7		conditions are meant to insulate the Gas Compani	es from their non-utility affiliates and
8		mitigate effects of a potential WEC downgrade or	the Gas Companies. ²⁰
9			
10			
11	IX.	Review of the Proposed Transaction in 	Michigan
12	Q.	Has an application relating to the proposed tra	nsaction been filed with the Michigan
13		Public Service Commission ("MPSC")?	
14	A.	Yes. WEC, TEG, WPSC, Michigan Gas Utilities	Corporation, and WEPCO filed a joint
15		application and testimony on August 6, 2014 in C	ase Number U-17682.
16			
17	Q.	What is the status of MPSC Case Number U-1	7682?
18	А.	Staff and Intervenor testimony was originally sch	eduled to be filed on October 31, 2014
19		with a hearing set for November 19, 21, 24 and 23	5, 2014, but a revised scheduling order
20		issued on October 30, 2014 added a significant an	nount of time to the schedule.
21			
22	Q.	What is the current schedule for MPSC Case N	Number U-17682?
23	А.	A revised scheduling order issued on October 30,	2014 set the following schedule:
24			
25		Staff and Intervenor Testimony	February 2, 2015
26		Rebuttal Testimony	February 12, 2015
27		Motions to Strike	February 17, 2015
28		Responses to Motions	February 20, 2015

 ¹⁹ ICC AG Exhibit 2.0 Direct Testimony of Sebastian Coppola, ICC City/CUB Exhibit 4.0, Direct Testimony of Michael P. Gorman, ICC Staff Exhibit 2.0, Direct Testimony of Eric Lounsberry and ICC City/CUB Exhibit 3.0, Direct Testimony of William Cheaks Junior, available on the ICC website.
 ²⁰ ICC Staff Exhibit 7.0, Direct Testimony of Michael McNally, available on the ICC website.

1		Cross Exam Hearing	February 23-26, 2015
2		Briefs	March 19, 2015
3		Reply Briefs	April 2, 2015
4		PFD Target Date	May 7, 2015
5		Exceptions	May 14, 2015
6		Replies to Exceptions	May 20, 2015
7			
8	Q.	Who are the intervenors in MPSC Case No	umber U-17682?
9	A.	Entities that have intervened include: the Mic	higan Attorney General, MPSC Staff,
10		Cloverland Electric Cooperative, Inc., Citizer	ns Against Rate Excess, Tilden Mining
11		Company, Empire Iron Mining Partnership, F	Fibrek, and Verso Paper.
12			
13	Q.	Are you able at this time to assess condition	ns for approval of the acqusition that
14		have been proposed in Michigan?	
15	A.	Because testimony is not scheduled to be file	d until February 2, 2015, it is not possible at
16		this time to assess any acquisition conditions	that might be proposed in Michigan.
17			
18			
19	X.	Wisconsin Ratepayer Protections	
20	Q.	Do WEC and TEG have any existing ring-	fencing provisions that they must abide
21		by?	
22	A.	Data request 2-CUB/Inter-2 asked WEC and	TEG this question. WEC responded that
23		pursuant to a recent rate order, WEPCO had	restrictions placed on its dividends to WEC,
24		as follows.	
25			
26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34		As part of the 2013 Wisconsin rate ca Commission of Wisconsin (PSCW) Electric Power Company (WEPCO) capital structure common equity rati WEPCO may not pay dividends ab would cause the company to fall be levels of common equity (51.0%). S Wisconsin rate case order, which is at	in December of 2012, Wisconsin was ordered to maintain a financial o range between 48.5% and 53.5%. ove the test year level if doing so clow the midpoint of the authorized ee pages 61 through 63 of the 2013

- 1 TEG responded that WPSC had a similar provision.
- 3 As part of the 2014 Wisconsin rate case order issued by the Public Service 4 Commission of Wisconsin (PSCW) in December of 2013, WPSC was 5 ordered to maintain a financial capital structure common equity ratio range 6 between 49% and 54%. Further, WPSC shall not pay, without 7 Commission approval, normal dividends greater than 103 percent of the prior year's common dividend. WPSC shall notify the Commission if any 9 special dividend is contemplated. No special dividend that might cause the 10 common equity, on a financial basis as calculated in the rate case order, to drop below the projected calendar year average of 51.00 percent or the 11 12 dollar amount of equity reflected in the test year, is permitted without 13 Commission approval. See pages 35 through 39 of the 2014 Wisconsin rate case order, which is attached hereto. 14 15
- 16 Both responses also cite provisions under the Wisconsin Holding Company Act, Wis.
- Stat. § 196.795, which places restrictions on activities between the utility and its 17 18 affiliates.
- 19

8

20 **Q**. Given the potential risks to Wisconsin ratepayers and the acquisition conditions 21 proposed thus far in other jurisdictions reviewing the proposed transaction, do you 22 think that the existing ring-fencing provisions and the approval conditions identified 23 in the Application are adequate?

- 24 No. The existing ring-fencing provisions and the conditions of approval identified in the A. 25 Application are not adequate. They do not address the potential adverse outcomes that I 26 identified earlier in this testimony. For example, assume that WEPCO has a capital 27 structure that has a 54% equity ratio. WEPCO could send dividends to WEC in the 28 amount of \$400 million and still have an equity ratio of 51%, as shown in Figure 7 29 below. WEPCO's 2013 net income was \$360 million, so a \$400 million dividend would 30 exceed this level of net income by a significant margin, resulting in a payout ratio of 31 more than 100% and the extraction of cash out of the regulated subsidiary to the parent 32 company. I believe that such an action should require Commission approval, but 33 Commission approval would not be necessary under the current ring-fencing provisions 34 described by WEC and TEG.
- 35

	Before div	idend		After divi	dend
	\$ (millions)	%	Dividend \$ (millions)	\$ (millions)	%
Equity	\$3,500	54%	\$400	\$3,100	51%
Debt	\$3,000	46%		\$3,000	49%
Total	\$6,500	100%		\$6,100	100%

5		
4	Q.	If the proposed transaction is to be approved, what ring-fencing provisions would
5		you recommend be established by the Commission?
6	A.	The following conditions are necessary to protect Wisconsin customers from harm
7		caused by the proposed transaction:
8 9 10		• Require that each Wisconsin regulated subsidiary maintain its own credit rating and portfolio of debt that is independent of the post-acquisition parent.
11 12 13 14		• Prohibit each Wisconsin regulated subsidiary from loaning funds to or borrowing funds from the post-acquisition parent or other regulated subsidiaries.
15 16 17 18		• Restrict dividends from Wisconsin regulated subsidiaries to the parent company. For example, in any future year, the payout ratio should not exceed each company's average payout ratio for the most recent four years without Commission approval.
19 20 21 22		• Identify all transaction, transition, and acquisition premium costs in an accounting system.
23 24 25		• Deny recovery of all transaction costs regardless of whether incurred before or after the transaction closes.
26		• Deny deferral of and recovery of all transition costs.
27		• Deny direct and indirect recovery of the acquisition premium.
28		
29		The first two conditions listed above will help insure that the debt costs paid by
30		Wisconsin ratepayers are just and reasonable, market-based, and not adversely affected
31		by the performance of the parent company or any affiliates. The third condition will help

1		prevent the extraction of excessive cash from Wisconsin regulated companies to the
2		parent company. The last four conditions will prevent Wisconsin ratepayers from paying
3		for the costs of the merger of parent companies.
4		
5	Q.	If the proposed transaction is to be approved, are there any other conditions you
6		would recommend?
7	A.	Yes. The ring-fencing provisions proposed above are the minimum necessary to reduce
8		the potential for harm to Wisconsin customers from the proposed transaction. I
9		understand that other parties to this proceeding may be proposing additional conditions,
10		and I reserve the right to supplement this list after my review of those conditions.
11		
12		Additional conditions providing quantifiable benefits to customers are also necessary in
13		order for the transaction to be deemed to be in the "best interests" of customers. The total
14		amount of the acquisition, including equity purchase price, assumed net debt, and
15		transaction costs and fees is \$ ²¹ The amount of transaction costs and fees (i.e.,
16		the amount to be paid to bankers, lawyers, etc.) to consummate the transaction is \$
17		. ²² Given the dollar amounts at issue in this transaction, I recommend the
18		following:
19 20 21 22		• An earnings cap on the annual actual earnings of WEPCO, WG, and WPSC that would return to customers any earnings above each company's authorized return on equity (currently 10.2%, 10.3%, and 10.2%, respectively).
23 24 25		• Permanent write off of WEPCO's transmission escrow costs, thereby excluding these costs from rates.
26		The first additional condition listed above will benefit Wisconsin ratepayers by returning
27		excess profits to customers. The second additional listed condition above will provide a
28		direct benefit by lowering electric rates in the future.
29		

 ²¹ See the document entitled "", p. 2 "S&U" that WEC produced in discovery in this docket. WEC deems this document highly confidential and filed it via ERF as "IL WEC City 6.01 Attach 01 CONFIDENTIAL & PROPRIETARY."
 ²² Id.

1		Determining appropriate benefits conditions is not a scientific process, but conditions like
2		these are reasonable and comparable to conditions for other acquisitions and mergers,
3		given the size of the proposed transaction.
4		
5		Also, it is my understanding that if the proposed transaction is approved, new generation
6		WPSC has proposed to construct at the Fox Energy Center would be delayed given
7		WEPCO's capacity surplus. ²³ WEC should clarify whether it is offering this as a
8		condition of the proposed transaction.
9		
10	Q.	Are you aware of anything else that impacts your analysis in this proceeding?
11	А.	Yes. On January 13, the day before this testimony was due, I reviewed a press release
12		from the Michigan Governor's office announcing that progress had been made on an
13		energy solution for the Upper Peninsula of Michigan. A copy of this release is attached
14		as ExCUB-Hahn-7. I have not had sufficient time to consider the impacts of this new
15		proposal and reserve my right to amend, withdraw, or supplement this testimony at a later
16		date based on this new information.
17		
18	Q.	It is possible that proceedings in Illinois and Michigan could establish acquisition
19		conditions after the record has closed in this proceeding that could have an impact
20		on Wisconsin?
21	А.	Yes.
22		
23	Q.	Is there a way for the Commission to protect against any adverse impacts to
24		Wisconsin ratepayers from those proceeding?
25	А.	Assuming the Commission approves the proposed transaction, this Commission could
26		require that that Applicant offer to Wisconsin any conditions that are ordered or part of a
27		settlement in any other jurisdiction that reviews the proposed transaction. This condition
	22	

²³ See WEC's 8k filed with the SEC on November 12, 2014, p. 9, attached hereto as Ex.-CUB-Hahn-6 ("Lazard's intrinsic value analysis did not take into account value associated with enhanced dividend, selected transaction benefits (e.g., multiple expansion, capital reallocation, etc.) or the value impact of breakage costs (e.g., regulatory concessions associated with transaction approval, <u>delay of Integrys generation investment given Wisconsin Energy's</u> capacity surplus, etc.)." (emphasis added) See also,

1		would be equivalent to a "most favored nation's clause" and would ensure that Wisconsin	
2		ratepayers are afforded at least the same level of benefits and protections that are	
3		provided to ratepayers in other states; however this condition on its own should not take	
4		the place of the other conditions discussed in this testimony.	
5			
6			
7	XI.	Conclusion	
8	Q.	Does this conclude your testimony?	
9	A.	At this time, yes, it does. If additional, relevant information becomes available, I will	

10 supplement this testimony as appropriate.